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Recent Decisions
NEGLIGENCE - PRODUCTS LIABILITY - EXTENT
OF A MANUFACTURER'S DUTY
Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks, 369 F.2d 324
(9th Cir. 1966).
In the fifty years since the renowned decision of MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co.,' the scope of a manufacturer's duty to compen-
sate negligently injured consumers has expanded dramatically.2 Ac-
cording to leading contemporary scholars, the MacPherson negli-
gence principle has been developed to hold manufacturers to a duty of
reasonable care to see that "intended users" of a manufactured prod-
uct will not be injured when making an "intended use" thereof.8
Just as the concrete attributes of that abstract personage, the "in-
tended user," can be understood only by reference to post-1916
decisions,4 the breadth of the concept of "intended use" can be com-
prehended only by a similar study of academic and case authority.
The weight of contemporary authority unmistakably holds that the
class of intended uses of a manufactured product includes those
uses that are reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer.5 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has, however, in its recent decision
of Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks,6 apparently restricted the scope of
1217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2 Prior to the MacPherson case, a consumer could not recover for the negligence of
a manufacturer unless he could show that he stood in contractual privity with the manu-
facturer or that the product of the manufacturer was imminently or inherently dan-
gerous. 1 FRt.MER & FRMDMAN, PRODUCrS IIABMIY §§ 5.01-.02 (1966); PRossm,
TORTS § 96, at 658-60 (3d ed. 1964). In holding that any product "reasonably cer-
tain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made" was sufficiently dangerous
to fall within the imminently or inherently dangerous classification, MacPherson elimi-
nated the requirement of contractual privity as a precondition to recovery. 217 N.Y.
at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053. For a discussion of the development of a manufacturer's
liability for negligence since MacPherson, see I FnRM & FRMMAN, op. cit. supra
§§ 5.03-.03[l]; PROSSER, op. cit. supra at 661-72; James, Products Liability (pts. 1-2),
34 TMxAs L REv. 44, 49-77, 192-218 (1955).
8 See 1 FRuMER. & FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 5.03[l), at 23; RESTATE-
mENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 395 (1965).
4
'"The MacPherson decision did not go beyond liability to the ultimate purchaser
himself. Later cases have extended it to the purchaser's employees and other users of
the chattel, to members of his family, to subsequent purchasers, and to casual by-
standers." PROSSER, op. ctit. supra note 2, § 96, at 662-63. (Foomotes omitted.)
5 E.g., Mazzi v. Greenlee Tool Co., 320 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1963); Spruill v. Boyle-
Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962); 1 FRUMrM & FRuMAN, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 11.02, at 210.7; PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 96, at 667-68.
6 369 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1966).
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"intended use" to those uses of a product that are actually known
by the manufacturer. The language of the Simpson court is rather
ambiguous, to the extent that any conclusions as to the significance
of the case must be postponed until after close analysis of the court's
opinion.
The plaintiff in Simpson, a longshoreman, injured himself when
he fell through the cardboard wrapping of a bundle of doors that
had been packaged and manufactured by the defendant Simpson
Timber Company. The longshoreman at the time of the injury
was walking upon a "floor" of bundles that had been set in place
within the hold of a cargo ship.' He sought to recover damages in
federal district court for personal injuries caused by the company's
alleged negligence. On the defendant's appeal to the Ninth Cir-
cuit from a jury verdict for the plaintiff, an issue concerning the
propriety of the trial court's instructions to the jury was raised.8
The contraverted instruction directed the jury to find the manu-
facturer negligent if it were found that the defendant knew " 'or
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known' "' of the
stevedoring practice of walking upon cargo already set into place,
and under those circumstances, if the failure of the company to
warn of the weakness of the bundles created an unreasonable risk
of harm to the plaintiff."9
The majority opinion in Simpson held the trial court's instruc-
tion erroneous on the ground that it imposed too broad a scope of
duty upon the defendant." According to the court, the instruction
7 Id. at 326. The longshoreman was employed by a stevedore company which had
contracted to stow cargo for a shipping company which in turn had agreed with the de-
fendant to ship the bundles of doors. The defendant, in bundling the doors, wrapped
them with cardboard in such a manner that the finished bundles contained concealed
"wells," formed by holes cut in the door frames for the later insertion of glass panes.
Also, there was no warning of the dangerous condition printed on the bundles. Ibid.
8 Id. at 327. At trial the plaintiff offered evidence tending to prove that it was a
common stevedoring practice to stow cargo in layers and that previously stowed layers
were used as "floors" upon which workmen would walk while placing additional cargo
within the ship's hold. Id. at 327-28. A jury verdict was returned against the defen-
dant company. After a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court judgment,
a petition for rehearing by the Ninth Circuit en banc was granted. For an excellent
discussion and analysis of the panel's decision in Simpson, see 54 GEO. L.J. 1439
(1966). The plaintiff also sued the shipper, but that cause of action is beyond the
scope of this discussion.
9 369 F.2d at 327.
10 Ibid.
11 Id. at 328. The Simpson court evidently considered the problem of the defen-
dant's knowledge, whether foreseeable or actual, as a factor in determining the scope of
the defendant's duty rather than as a determinant of proximate causation. See 54 GEo.
L.J. 1439, 1441 n.8 (1966). Commentators are in agreement that the scope of a de-
fendant's knowledge is critical in the determination of his duty. See, e.g., PROSSER,
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would cause a packager to be burdened "with a legal duty to ascer-
tain the customary working practices of stevedores in any port which
the purchaser, a shipper or transporter might select for loading and
embarkation.""2  The majority reasoned that since no difficulty
would be encountered in ascertaining customary stevedoring prac-
tices in any port, the effect of the instruction would be to preclude
a packager from claiming that he had satisfied his duty of reason-
able care unless he had undertaken to universally learn of such prac-
tices."3
The court placed primary reliance on the authority of McCready
v. United Iron & Steel Co.'4 in which the plaintiff's decedent was
using the horizontal cross-bars of a casement window frame as a
ladder to facilitate the installation of glass panes. The decedent
fell to his death because the cross-bars were not welded to the verti-
cal frame of the casement firmly enough to support his weight.
The majority emphasized the McCready holding that it was not a
normal or intended that a casement frame should be used as a lad-
op. cit. supra note 2, § 50, at 294-97; Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61
COLUM. L REV. 1401 (1961).
However, the commentators point out that social policy considerations, such as the
ability of large corporations to bear negligence losses, will often determine the presence
of a duty apart from foreseeability or knowledge of a risk. The scope of knowledge is
not an automatic equivalent to duty. See PRossmR, op. cit. suPra note 2, § 50, at 296-
97. The Simpson court also considered finding a duty for the manufacturer on thebasis of social policy but subsequently rejected such a thesis. 369 F.2d at 330 n.7.
121d. at 328. (Emphasis added.)
13 The objection in the majority opinion to the trial court's instructions went merely
to the usage of the words "'in the exercise of reasonable care [the defendant] should
have known."' Id. at 327. The segment of the instruction calling for the imposition
of liability on the defendant if it were found that the manufacturer had actual knowl-
edge of the stevedoring practice of walking on already-stowed cargo was approved by
the majority. On this basis the case was remanded to the trial court in order that thejury might consider the circumstances of the case "with reasonable inferences" to de-
termine the presence or absence of actual knowledge. Id. at 328. For a discussion of
the significance of the Ninth Circuit's instructions to the trial court on remanding the
case, see text accompanying notes 34-38 infra.
The court's opinion indicated that a jury question of actual knowledge lay in the
fact that the defendant had a warehouse on the waterfront in Portland, Oregon, that
the manufacturer's plant manager was an inquisitive frequenter of the dock area, and
that the defendant shipped 16,000 to 18,000 doors overseas annually. 369 F.2d at 328.
The majority did not purport to state as an absolute rule that the defendant must have
actual knowledge of a hazardous use before a legal duty will be imposed. The court
pointed out that when "a hazard is so obvious as to permit of no doubt that one couldhave anticipated it, then he may be held to the same responsibility that rests upon one
to whom the hazard is 'known."' Id. at 328 n.5. Also, the Simpson court indicated
in dictum that an extended duty could be imposed upon a defendant if his product was
"inherently dangerous or harmful." Id. at 328-29.
14 272 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1959).
15 Id. at 702-03.
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der and that a defendant manufacturer could properly "'assume
that his product... [wouldi be devoted to its normal use."6
In applying the MacPherson negligence principle, 7 the Simpson
court clearly indicated that a lack of contractual privity between
the defendant company and the plaintiff was not the basis for the
court's decision. The judgment for the plaintiff was reversed not
because he was an "unintended user," but because he was making
an "unintended use" of the product'"
The dissenting opinion construed the rule of law contained in
the trial court's instruction as not obligating the defendant either
to learn of possible longshoremen's practices or to insure that its
product would be fit for all uses incident to the process of loading. 9
Rather, the minority construed the jury instruction to impose only
a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances to learn the prac-
tices of stevedores.
It was reasoned that the restriction of the defendant's duty to
those potentially harmful uses that were actually known rewarded
the defendant's ignorance:20 "The majority holds that a manufac-
turer is required to guard against only those risks which it actually
knows. The more limited the manufacturer's knowledge, the less
onerous its duty. Ignorance, no matter how unjustified, affords a
complete defense to a charge of negligence .... $21 Implicit in
the dissenting opinion is the criticism that the majority did not rec-
ognize the imposition of a "moderate" duty upon the manufacturer.
Seemingly, under the Simpson rationale, the manufacturer could
have either an absolute duty to learn of all stevedoring practices or
no duty of self-information. The minority rejected both extreme
16 Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks, 369 F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1966), citing Mc-
Cready v. United Iron & Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 1959).
17 For a discussion of the MacPherson negligence rule, see note 2 supra and text
accompanying note 3 supra.
18369 F.2d at 330-31. That an intermediate handler of a product, such as the
longshoreman in Simpson, may be an "intended user" and not subject to a privity de-
fense has been established in several other cases. E.g., Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc.
v. -ungerholt, 319 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1963) (trucker); Central Steel Tub Co. v. Her-
zog, 203 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1953) (employee of supplier); McFall v. Compagnie Mari-
time Belge (Lloyd Royal) S.A., 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952) (longshoreman).
The Simpson court recognized and apparently approved the holdings in Hungerholt
and Herzog but found them inapplicable. 369 F.2d at 330-31 n.8.
19 Id. at 332.
20 Id. at 331. For a discussion of the relationship of a defendant's knowledge and
duty, see note 11 supra.
21 369 F.2d at 331 (dissenting opinion).
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positions, asserting that the concept incorporated in the trial court's
instruction was "a more sensible middle ground."22
The dissenters also indicated2 that the court had misread the
McCready case"' which, while holding for the defendant, did not
adopt a test of duty which limited a manufacturer's liability to only
those uses of its product of which the manufacturer had actual
knowledge. Rather, McCready held against the plaintiff on the
ground that the decedent's use of the product was "not reasonably
anticipated.
25
The Simpson holding may be understood in two ways. First,
and perhaps more justifiably, it may be viewed as setting forth a
narrow test of "actual knowledge" upon which the duty of a manu-
facturer toward users of its products may be based 26 However,
such a view is contrary to the vast weight of both academic and
case authority27 which, in discussing the breadth of the "intended
use" doctrine, appears to define its scope in terms of reasonable fore-
seeability. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc."5 held that the "intended
use" rule is merely a shorthand method for expressing a test of
knowledge properly based upon reasonable foreseeability:
"Intended use" is but a convenient adaptation of the basic test
of "reasonable foreseeability" framed to more specifically fit the
factual situations out of which arise questions of a manufacturer's
liability for negligence. "Intended use" is not an inflexible for-
mula to be apodictally applied to every case 9
221d. at 332.
231d. at 335.
2 4 McCready v. United Iron & Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1959). For a
discussion of the McCready case, see text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
25 272 F.2d at 703. (Emphasis added.) The Simpson minority rejected the dis-
tinction drawn by the majority in dictum that manufacturers may properly be charged
with an extended duty if their products are inherently dangerous. 369 F.2d at 334-
35. It should be remembered that the MacPherson holding abrogated such a distinc-
tion. For a discussion of the MacPherson case, see note 2 supra. Contemporary schol-
ars likewise reject the "inherently dangerous" distinction. E.g., 1 FRUME & FRIED-
MAN, op. cit. supra note 2, 5 5.03[ll, at 29-30.2; PRossER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 96,
at 661.
26 For a discussion of the relationship between a defendant's knowledge and his
duty, see note 11 supra.
27 The following cases either expressly or impliedly recognize that the scope of "in-
tended use" is determined by a test of reasonable foreseeability: Mazzi v. Greenlee Tool
Co., 320 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1963); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir.
1962); Marker v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1957); Boyl v.
California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669 (D. Ore. 1963). See treatises cited note 5
supra. This writer has not discovered a case, other than Simpson, which expressly re-
stricts a defendant's duty to those instances in which he has actual knowledge of his
product's use.
28 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
29 Id. at 83.
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Neither McCready nor Cohagan v. Laclede Steel Co.," also
cited in the majority opinion, specifically limited the duty of the
respective defendant-manufacturers to instances where the "unin-
tended use" was actually known. Rather, both cases held that the
factual situations present did not warrant charging the defendants
with "reasonable" knowledge of the hazardous use.3" If it is con-
cluded that the Simpson court posited a new test of knowledge, it
must be conceded that such a test is without precedent.32 Evidence
of the novel character of the Ninth Circuit's holding may be seen
in the plaintiff's claim that the defendant never did object to the
trial court instruction, but rather that the appellate court struck
down the instruction on its own volition.3"
A second view, namely, that the majority misinterpreted the
nature of the trial court's instruction but still applied a test of sim-
ilar substantive content, is tenable and would fit comfortably within
the context of prior decisions. The Simpson court did remand the
case to the trial court so that the jury might consider whether the
officers of the defendant company had actual knowledge of the
stevedoring practice of walking upon previously stowed cargo. 4 In
considering the remanded issue, the jury was to be permitted to con-
sider the factual circumstances of the case in conjunction with "rea-
sonable inferences" drawn from those facts. 5 Whether this "rea-
sonable inference" test for knowledge can be effectively distin-
guished from the traditional rule, 6 which presumes that knowledge
could have been attained had the defendant exercised reasonable
care under the circumstances, is questionable. Such a distinction
30 317 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1958).
3 1 In Cohagan, the plaintiff was struck by heavy steel wiring that had become dis-
engaged from the bundle of steel it was securing. The wiring was loosened when the
bundle was picked up by a crane hook, the hook being attached to the wiring. The
court held that the plaintiff did not offer sufficient evidence to show a custom in the
plaintiff's trade of hooking wrapping wires in order to transport bundles. Id. at 454.
There is no language in Cohagan that would support the narrow test of knowledge
seemingly posed by the Simpson court. For a discussion of the McCready case, see text
accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
32 See authorities cited note 27 supra.
33 Brief for Appellee on Petition for Rehearing, pp. 2-3, Simpson Timber Co. v.
Parks, 369 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1966). Despite the consistent application of the "reason-
able knowledge" test by the courts, the results have not been particularly consistent.
Compare McCready v. United Iron & Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1959), with
Mazzi v. Greenlee Tool Co., 320 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1963). See generally Noel, Manu-
facturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816,
856-62 (1962).
34369 F.2d at 328, 331.
3 3 Id. at 328.
36 For a discussion of the traditional rule, see text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
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appears, at first blush, to be a tenuous basis for distinguishing rules
of knowledge.
If it may be assumed that inferential knowledge must depend
ultimately upon actual knowledge, then a distinction between the
appellate court's instruction on remand and the traditional test may
be drawn. 7  Under such an assumption, the scope of reasonable
inferences would merely be a variable dependent upon what is ac-
tually known by the defendant, thus ultimately retaining the sub-
jective nature of the test. The traditional test, in contrast, considers
matters other than what the defendant actually knew in determin-
ing whether a defendant should have known of a potentially harm-
ful use."8
If one were to conclude that the "reasonable inferences" test is
merely the traditional "reasonable knowledge" test under another
guise, then the Simpson case could not be understood to have
changed the law. This proposition is dubious at best. "  Properly
viewed, Simpson appears to stand for the general rule that a manu-
facturer's duty to a consumer arises only when the manufacturer
has actual knowledge of a harmful use.4" The unfortunate conse-
quences of this change in the law are manifold. First, it encour-
ages manufacturers to remain ignorant of uses involving unreason-
able risks. As a corollary, the rule discourages manufacturers, the
parties in the best position to remedy manufacturing defects, from
exercising vigilance in production - a patently erroneous policy.
Second, the increasing complexity of commercial practices war-
rants an extension, rather than a contraction, of a manufacturer's
37 Some justification for such an assumption may be found in the principal hold-
ing of the Simpson court. The tenor of the majority's argument went to a rejection
of a test of knowledge based upon what the defendant should have known and ap.
proval of a test that charged the defendant with responsibility for only that which the
company's officers actually knew. It would seem incorrect to consider that the court's
instructions on remand incorporated a legal test inconsistent with the basic holding, as
would be the result under the reasonable knowledge test For a discussion of the Simp-
son court's basic holding, see notes 10-13 supra and accompanying text.
3s Cases which apply the traditional test often look to the presence of a custom in
a trade or business to employ a seemingly unintended use in determining whether the
use is foreseeable by the defendant. E.g., McCready v. United Iron & Steel Co., 272
F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 1959); Cohagan v. Laclede Steel Co., 317 S.W.2d 452, 454
(Mo. 1958). In its instructions on remanding the Simpson case, the Ninth Circuit
did not include the fact that walking on previously stowed cargo might have been a
trade custom as a factor for jury consideration. Instead, the factors presenting a jury
question of actual knowledge were all matters of which the defendant had actual knowl-
edge. For a delineation of the factors to be considered by the trial court on remand,
see note 13 supra.
30 See notes 37-38 supra.
40 The statement is only a general proposition; several exceptions were suggested
by the court's opinion. For a delineation of the exceptions, see note 13 supra.
19671 1759
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
responsibility.41 As the number of possible users such as shippers,
wholesalers, and retailers increases, so does the number of possible
uses. It is highly improbable that a manufacturer could have ac-
tual knowledge of commercial practices in cities distant from the
manufacturer's plant. Yet, because a responsible manufacturer is
often fully able to prevent harm from the use of its product and
because the manufacturer is able to spread the risk of harm to the
public by charging higher prices, -there is little reason to hold the
manufacturer to only those risks of which he has actual knowl-
edge.4
2
Finally, the rule and the exceptions seemingly generated by
Simpson will not simplify the task of the trial judge. A trial court
will not only have to determine whether a manufacturer had actual
knowledge of an "unintended use," but, even in the absence of such
knowledge, the trial court will also be obliged to determine whether
the product was inherently or imminently dangerous, whether the
hazard was so obvious that the manufacturer could not avoid notice
thereof, or whether reasonable inferences from the circumstances
of the case could show that the defendant had knowledge of the
use before a products liability case, under the Ninth Circuit test,
could be disposed of.43  In contrast to the relatively simple tradi-
tional test,44 the process advocated by Simpson is tortuously cum-
bersome. It is hoped that the rationale of the Ninth Circuit will
be given little credence in -the future.
JEFFREY P. WHIm
41 In the early 1900's, when manufactured products often passed directly from the
manufacturer to the consumer, a restriction of liability to those uses of which the man-
ufacturer had actual knowledge may have been justified. The number of "uses" of a
product in the hands of one party was limited, and it would be more likely that a man-
ufacturer would have had actual knowledge of a foreseeable misuse of a product than
under today's complex commercial practices through which a product may be sub-
jected to a multiplicity of "unintended uses" by a half-dozen or more intermediate han-
dlers before reaching the ultimate consumer.
42 See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 50, at 296-97.
43 For a discussion of the exceptions to the rule posed by Simpson, see note 13 supra.
44 For a discussion of the traditional test, see text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
The traditional test appears to involve only two steps. First, it must be determined
whether the plaintiff's use of the defendant's product is reasonably foreseeable and
whether the defendant is under a duty to the plaintiff. Second, if it is found that the
defendant did owe a duty to the plaintiff, it must then be determined whether the de-
fendant fulfilled or breached his duty. Ibid.
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